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Abstract
It is repeatedly and persistently claimed in the literature that a specific trace cri-
terion d would guarantee universal composition security in quantum cryptography.
Currently that is the sole basis of unconditional security claim in quantum key distri-
bution. In this paper, it is shown that just security against known-plaintext attacks
when the generated key is used in direct encryption is not provided by d. The prob-
lem is directly connected with several general problems in the existing unconditional
security proofs in quantum key distribution. A number of issues will be clarified con-
cerning the nature of true security, privacy amplification, key generation rate and the
mathematical approach needed for their determination in concrete protocols.
Note added: It has now been shown that security for a proper form of d is obtained
in an average sense. See arXiv:1205.5065v2. Many issues in this paper have been
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clarified and further elaborated, see arXiv:1201.2804v1 and references cited therein.
I Introduction and Summary
In quantum key distribution (QKD) there have been many security proofs offered on the
“unconditional security” of various protocols of the BB84 variety. (For a recent review see
ref [1].) Until 2004-2005 and in many papers till the present day, the security criterion
adopted is the attacker Eve’s quantum accessible information (Iac) on the generated key K,
which is the maximum mutual information Eve has on K from a measurement result on her
probe she may set during the key generation process. Security of K before it is actually used
is called “raw security” [2], to distinguish it with composition security when K is actually
used in an application for which Eve may possess additional information related to K. In
particular, when K is used for encryption, part of K may be known to Eve in a known-
plaintext attack (KPA) to help her get at the rest of K. KPA takes a particularly simple
form when K is used in the often suggested one-time pad format.
While “universal” composition security is a complicated matter which is perhaps not
needed in its full generality, KPA security is necessary because that is one main weakness of
conventional symmetric key ciphers QKD purports to overcome. Indeed, there is otherwise
no need for QKD since its raw security is worse than that of conventional ciphers in which
the key is also typically totally hidden by uniformly random data [2]. In this paper all
security under discussion is information-theoretic (IT), and symmetric key cipher is the
proper comparison with QKD, not purely complexity-based cipher such as RSA. This is
because a shared message authentication key is necessary in QKD during key generation,
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and in any case a short shared secret key can always be employed.
It was claimed in [3] that an exponentially small Iac (for an n-bit key K) would guarantee
universal composition security and that is applicable to most previous security proofs. The
claim was established through an inequality between Iac and a trace distance criterion that
has been given by the notation “d” in many papers since [4], an abbreviation we adopt in
this paper. This d is supposed to give the trace distance between the states of an “ideal”
protocol and the “real” protocol under Eve’s attack. It was shown in [4] through an explicit
construction involving quantum information locking that exponentially small Iac does not
imply KPA security, specifically the last bit of K may be leaked deterministically when n−1
bits of K are known to Eve from a KPA. This small leak has been enlarged to a “spectacular
failure” of the Iac guarantee, under which it is possible that “leakage of even a logarithmic
number of key bits compromises the secrecy of all the others”. [5]
The remedy, according to [4-7], is to use the criterion d directly. Indeed, d is the only basis
of QKD unconditional security claim at present including any use of privacy amplification
[1, footnote 20], [6-7]. There are three different “interpretations” on what d ≤ ǫ asserts,
each of which is claimed to imply universal composition security. We would concentrate on
KPA security in this paper, which is much simpler and can be treated directly. The three
interpretations are:
(i) “The real and the ideal setting can be considered to be identical with probability at
least 1− ǫ”. [6]
(ii) The parameter ǫ can be understood as the “maximum failure probability” of the real
protocol, i.e., the maximum probability that the real protocol “deviates from the be-
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havior of the ideal protocol”. [8]
(iii) “Distinguishability advantage” between the real and the ideal protocols is bounded by
ǫ. [3]
In this paper all three interpretations will be analyzed, only briefly on (i) because [2]
already shows that (i) cannot be true. With (ii) interpreted with respect to a specific
scenario so that it is different from the more general (i), it is refuted by a specific KPA
counter-example. In fact, d could be interpreted as the difference between two probabilities
but it does not have a probability interpretation itself. We will explain why (iii) does not
lead to KPA security in general. A different criterion d′ is needed for such interpretation.
In sum, there is no QKD unconditional security proof at all against attacks with quantum
memory. The ramification of this security failure will be elaborated. The actual QKD
security situation will be discussed in regard to the secure key generation rate, privacy
amplification, and the necessity of using M-ary quantum detection theory in quantifying
fundamental security performance unless d′ is bound.
II CLASSICAL VARIATIONAL DISTANCE AND QUAN-
TUM TRACE DISTANCE
The classical variational distance v(P,Q) between two probability distributions P = {pi}
and Q = {qi} on the same sample space is given by [9]
v(P,Q) =
1
2
∑
i
| pi − qi | (1)
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with 0 ≤ v ≤ 1. The quarantee v ≤ ε is equivalent to, for any event E , the probabilities of
E from P and Q satisfy
| p(E)− q(E) |≤ 2ε (2)
Indeed we have [9, p.299]
2v(P,Q) = max
ε
| p(E)− q(E) | (3)
An important case for our purpose is when Q equals the uniform distribution U , ui = 1/N
for sample space of size N = 2|K| while Eve has distribution P for K. Then (2) shows
| p(K˜)−
1
2|K˜|
|≤ 2ǫ (4)
for any subset K˜ of K when averaged over the possible value of K˜. (Note added: such
average (4) is established in arXiv:1205.5065v2, the original statement (4) is not correct for
individual K˜ value.) However, when ε
2−n
≫ 1, P may be very different from U in regards
to the possible p(E) even when ε is exponentially small, say ε = 2−n/2. Whether something
is small in a cryptographic context has to be judged with respect to the key length or data
length with exponentiation if appropriate.
The quantum trace distance between two density operators ρ and σ on the same state
space is
D(ρ, σ) =
1
2
‖ ρ− σ ‖1 (5)
with 0 ≤ D ≤ 1. It can be readily shown that D(ρ, σ) ≤ ε implies v(P,Q) ≤ ε for any
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quantum measurement which gives P and Q from ρ and σ [10]. By using the basis that
diagonalizes ρ − σ, D(ρ, σ) itself can be achieved by a measurement in the form v(P,Q).
Thus, we have the equivalence of variational distance with trace distance as a criterion.
It is important to stress that D(ρ, σ) ≤ ε does not imply that ρ and σ are close, similar
to v(P,Q) ≤ ε does not imply P and Q are close, unless ε is small enough. Incorrect
understanding of the security situation would result if the quantitative level of ε relative to
2−n is not attended to for an n-bit or n-qubit sequence. This is due to the large freedom of
P , in particular p1, that is possible under such a constraint for fixed σ or Q. This has been
emphasized in [2,11-13].
III PROBLEM FORMULATION AND RAW SECU-
RITY GUARANTEE
During the key generation process, Eve sets her probe and the protocol goes ahead after
intrusion level estimation. We assume that everything goes well on the user’s end. At
whatever time when Eve measures on her probe, she would obtain a whole probability
distribution on correctly estimating the different possible values of K [13]. Classically the
quantitative raw security problem can be formulated as follows. We will use upper case
letter for a random variable (vector) with its specific value denoted by the corresponding
lower case letter.
Let X be an m-bit data sequence random variable picked by user A and Y Eve’s obser-
vation random variable of any possible length and alphabet size. The transition probability
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p(y|x) and a priori distribution p(x) are fixed by the cryptosystem and chosen attack. The
user B observes the random variable Z specified by the cryptosystem, applies an openly
known known error-correcting code (ECC) to get a data estimate Xˆ(Z) which is presum-
ably error free, and then an openly known privacy amplification code (PAC) to yield a final
generated key K. The ECC and PAC can be combined to yield directly K(Z). From Y Eve
forms her estimate K(Y ). The timing of Eve’s knowledge of various openly known codes is
implicit in the possible p(y|x) she could obtain.
With Bayes rule and the known ECC+PAC, Eve forms from y the conditional probability
distribution (CPD) on K, p(k|y), which gives Eve’s success probability of getting the entire
k for each possible value of K. We will use P = {pi}, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, for this CPD, suppress-
ing the dependence on y. Any single-number criterion on K, be it mutual information or
variational distance, merely expresses a constraint on P . The Markov Inequality [9] can be
used to convert an average constraint to an individual one for a nonnegative random variable,
here it is p(k|Y ) for each k and random Y . We order pi so that p1 ≥ p2 ≥ . . . ≥ pN . Thus,
p1 is Eve’s optimal probability of estimating K correctly given y. It is a most significant
number concerning the security of K, as we will see.
With I(K; Y ) denoting the mutual information between any two random variables K
and Y , we use the following notations
δE ≡ v(P, U), IE ≡ I(P ;U) (6)
For simplicity, we take the data X to be uniformly distributed and the same for K obtained
fom it via ECC+PAC, the ideal situation. Thus δE and IE in (6) are indeed single-number
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measures of Eve’s “information” on K.
Note that it is not sufficient to employ a criterion that would give perfect IT security when
it has its limiting value, say δE = 0 or IE = 0, but using it for a relatively large nonzero value.
The issue is a quantitative one and whether the security guarantee is adequate depends on
the exact value that can be obtained in a concrete protocol, as we will see.
We have shown in [11-13] that for IE = 2
−l′, l′ > 0, Eve’s maximum probability of getting
the whole K can be as big as
p1 ∼ 2
−l, l = l
′
+ log n (7)
Unless l ∼ n, the raw security guarantee of IE ≤ 2
−l′ is very far from that of a uniform key.
The subsets of K suffer similarly [13]. When l
′
approaches n− logn, more exact estimate of
p1 [16] needs to be used in lieu of 2
−l since l cannot exceed n. The practical experimental
value of l′ ∼ 21 for n ∼ 4000 [14, 15] is quite an inadequate guarantee, especially after the
application of Markov Inequality [2,13]. Generally, “exponentially small in n′′ can be very
misleading because the rate λ in l = λn is the real crux of the security situation. We will
see this repeatedly in the following.
The δE guarantee suffers a similar problem [2,13] because for δE ≤ 2
−l, the averaged
(over Y) p1 can be as big as
p1 = 2
−l −
1
N
with δE = 2
−l (8)
Thus, unless l ∼ n as indicated after (4) above, a δE ≤ ǫ raw security guaranree is not really
better than that of IE ≤ ǫ.
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IV INCORRECTNESS OF INTERPRETATIONS (i)
AND (ii)
Let ρkE be Eve’s probe state when K has value k with probability p0(k) before B measures,
p0(k) = U in the ideal case. The possible ρ
k
E are limited by the users’ intrusion level
estimation. Let
ρK ≡
∑
k
p0(k) | k〉〈k | (9)
be the p0(k)-mixed state on N orthonormal | k〉
′s. Let ρE be the K-averaged state, and ρKE
the joint state
ρE ≡
∑
k
p0(k)ρ
k
E (10)
ρKE ≡
∑
k
p0(k) | k〉〈k | ⊗ρ
k
E (11)
The criterion d is defined to be,
d ≡
1
2
‖ ρKE − ρK ⊗ ρE ‖1 (12)
A key satisfying d ≤ ε is called “ǫ-secure” by defintion [6] in the case p0(k) = U .
The “lemma 1” of [6] and [16] was given the following interpretation on v(P,Q) ≤ ε: the
two random variablesK and Y described by P and Q take on the same value with probability
≥ 1−ε. (The lemma says there exists a joint distribution of K and Y which gives this result.
That joint distribution is in fact the optimal one for this interpretation.) Given this incorrect
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interpretation as premise, it can be validly deduced [6, p.414],[2] that under d ≤ ε, “the real
and the ideal setting can be considered to be identical with probability at least 1 − ε”. As
discussed in [2,13,17], this interpretation of d is not a consequence of “lemma 1” in [6] or
[16] but an incorrect interpretation of that lemma 1. We may note here that there is no
physically meaningful joint distribution that gives P and Q as marginals other than the
product distribution PQ which applies in this situation. Thus, the two random variables K
and Y would take the same value only as a result of random collision with probability 1/N ,
N the size of the sample space, even when P and Q are the same distribution. As concluded
in [2], interpretation (i) is simply false and not just unproven.
Going onto interpretation (ii), observe that its wording in [8] is very ambiguous. It can
mean either interpretation (i), or (iii) with ε as the probability difference between the real
and the ideal cases. We would give this “failure probability” a distinct literal interpretation
from the words of [8], since it is the sole basis of the QKD unconditional security claim in
the recent review [1]. In lieu of random variable identity or coincidence of (i), we restrict
(ii) to apply just to specific KPA scenarios in which performance can be readily quantified.
The following simple counter-example shows such interpretation (ii) cannot be expected to
hold, not just unproven.
Consider the following simplest information locking example, for a two-bit K with ρkE =
ρk1 ⊗ ρk2 for the two bits k1 and k2. Let |i〉, i ∈ 1− 4, be the four BB84 states on a qubit,
with 〈1|3〉 = 〈2|4〉 = 0. Let Pi be the projectors into |i〉, and
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ρ11E =
1
2
(P1 ⊗ P1 + P3 ⊗ P2)
ρ10E =
1
2
(P1 ⊗ P3 + P3 ⊗ P4)
ρ01E =
1
2
(P2 ⊗ P1 + P4 ⊗ P2)
ρ00E =
1
2
(P4 ⊗ P3 + P4 ⊗ P4)
(13)
Thus, k2 is locked into the second qubit through k1, and is unlocked by measuring on the
1-3 or 2-4 basis given the knowledge of k1. This ρ
k
E does not yield a ρE = I/4, but since d
is equal to [6, lemma 2]
d =
1
2
EK [‖ ρ
k
E − ρE ‖1], (14)
let us evaluate “ideal” comparison ‖ ρkE−I/4 ‖1 which is easily computed to be 1/2. However,
knowing k1 implies k2 is compromised for sure, not with a maximum failure probability 1/2,
contradicting the interpretation (ii) in this specific situation. (Note that the d ≤ ε guarantee
is supposed to apply to any ρkE in (12)).
Indeed, any locking information scenario provides a counter-example to (ii) similar to
the example of (13). Let Iac = 2
−l′ and with a ρkE that leaks the rest of K from its l bits
according to (7). The corresponding d must be less than 1 since D(ρ, σ) = 1 if and only if ρ
and σ have orthogonal ranges.
It does not appear there is any probability meaning one can sensibly give to ε in d ≤ ε,
which is just a numerical measure of the difference between two density operators similar to ε
between P andQ in v(P,Q) ≤ ε. There is simply no basis to assign probability distribution to
the security situation after all the parameters are fixed, i.e., there is no more random system
parameter that could give rise to such probability distribution. The incorrect probability
interpretation of ε in v(P,Q) ≤ ε is responsible for the incorrectness of interpretation (i).
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Here we see that any probability interpretation of ε itself, whatever the “failure probability”
may be, would fail similarly.
V SECURITY FAILURE UNDER INTERPRETATION
(iii)
Going on to interpretation (iii), note the huge difference between it and the other two
interpretations. According to (i) and (ii), d = 1/2 in the example of (13) is the probability
Eve can succeed, which is not true. According to interpretation (iii), Eve may succeed at
1/2 + d = 1, which is true (we actually use d′ to get the ideal situation.)
It may be observed that ε in D(ρ, σ) ≤ ε is not the success probability of distinguishing
ρ from σ by a measurement. That is given by the well known [18] probability Pc of correct
decision,
Pc =
1
2
+
1
2
D(ρ, σ) (15)
Note that Eve is not usually trying to make a binary decision with her attack. A major source
of confusion may have arisen from calling ρ and σ “ǫ-indistinguishable” when D(ρ, σ) ≤ ε, as
if ρ and σ can only be distinguished with probability ∼ ε. Actually just (15), or (2) for any
measurement, is the mathematical statement of “ǫ-indistinguishable”. Any other claimed
consequence needs to be mathematically expressed and derived from this mathematical given.
Such development has not been provided for universal composition security (which is different
from “composability” of the criterion), not just for KPA. Before going into the KPA issue we
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will show that (iii) is not generally true even for raw security, because the “ideal” situation
is not captured by ρU ⊗ ρE, as follows.
Consider a term ‖ ρkE − ρE ‖1 in (14) apart from averaging over K. It implies
v(p(y|k), p(y)) ≤ 2ε (16)
for Eve’s observation Y on her probe. Notice that under (iii), ǫ is merely a single-number
quantitative measure of difference, and thus has much weaker meaning than the equality of
whole state or distribution. Indeed, it is clear that the level of ǫ becomes crucial, as we saw
in section II, even if it is measured with respect to the “ideal”.
The following different criteria d′ should be used for security proofs (arXiv: 1205.5065v2)
d ≡
1
2
∑
k
||po(k)ρ
k
E −
1
N
ρE ||1 (17)
Note that there is no freedom of choice in replacing ρE of (17) by another state.
The distributions that lead to (7) appear to be of the form suitable for information locking
with small IE. Indeed, in [5] there is an l
′
factor in addition to O(logn) in the expression
for the number of unlocking bits in the key segment, exactly as in (7). In any case, complete
raw and composition security would obtain if the required number of bits to increase p1 to
1 goes up to n. For Iac ≤ 2
−l
′
, this would happen at
l
′
≥ n− logn (18)
For the case d′ ≤ 2−l or δE ≤ 2
−l, it would happen at
l ≥ n (19)
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It may be observed that KPA may significantly lower p(K˜), Eve’s success probability
of getting any K˜ ⊆ K, to an unacceptable level without deterministically compromising
the whole K. Partial information locking of K must, therefore, be dealt with also in a
fundamental security analysis. The KPA case alone already shows that there is no universal
composition security guarantee from d, at least when it is below a certain quantitative level.
This is in fact a problem of any single-number criterion, but we will not go into the general
issue in this paper.
VI RELATION BETWEEN HOLEVO QUANTITY χ
AND THE CRITERION d
The classical form of d, say as obtained from a measurement, is
δ =
1
2
v(p(y|k)p0(k); p(y)p0(k)) (20)
The following simple relation between the above δ and the classical mutual information
I(K; Y ) is an immediate consequence of the well known [9, p.300] relation between relative
entropy and variational distance by considering p(y, k) relative to p(y)p0(k). We have
Lemma 1:
The δ of (16) is upper bounded by I(K; Y ) in the form
2δ2 ≤ I(K; Y ) (21)
From (21), one obtains the weak bound,
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Lemma 2:
The criterion d is upper bounded by the quantum accessible information Iac that Eve can
get from her probe
2d2 ≤ 2|K|Iac (22)
Proof:
From (14) each term, ‖ ρkE − ρE ‖1 , is bounded by a measurement result Y
(k) satisfying
(21). Thus,
d ≤ EK [
I(K = k; Y (k))
2
]
1
2 (23)
By Jensen’s Inequality,
d ≤ [EK
I(K = k; Y (k))
2
]
1
2 (24)
which is bounded as (22) by adding many nonnegative terms for each Y (k) inside the [.]1/2
of (24) to get
∑
k I(K; Y ) = 2
|K|I(K; Y ) .
It is on the basis of equ(16) in [3], which is equivalent to (22), that the incorrect conclusion
is drawn in [3] that exponentially small Iac would guarantee composition security in previous
security proofs. Our (18) or (22) shows that the exponent needs to be nearly all of n for
such conclusion to hold. In the case of [14] with n ∼ 4000, this means the exponent needs
to be as big as l
′
∼ 3880.
The proper quantum generalization of Lemma 1 is not Lemma 2 but the following
Lemma 3:
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The Holevo quantity [10],
χ = S(ρE)− EK [S(ρ
k
E)] (25)
bounds d in the form,
2d2 ≤ χ (26)
Proof:
Similar to the classical (21), (26) follows from theorem 5.5 of [19] with the quantum
relative entropy S(ρ ‖ σ) for ρ = ρkE and σ = ρK ⊗ ρE .
Since the security criterion is supposed to work for each and every ρkE , consider the one
that leads to χ insecurity. Let χ = 2−2m, m > 0. Thus from (26), d ≤ 2−m but it is
insecure. However, since Iac ≤ χ, an Iac insecurity does not imply a χ insecurity. Although
Iac/n = χ/n asymptotically [20,21], the total Iac and χ are not necessarily close for large n.
One scenario that is the case is when blocks of such n bits are repeated n′ times themselves
for large n′, which is however not realistically applicable to concrete protocols.
The next theorem shows that χ and d have similar exponential behavior, and thus are
actually similar security criteria.
Theorem 1:
Let h(·) be the binary entropy function. Then
2d2 ≤ χ ≤ 8dn+ 2h(2d) (27)
Proof:
16
The lower bound is Lemma 3. The upper bound is an immediate consequence of the theorem
in [22], again using S(ρ‖σ) for ρ = ρkE and σ = ρK ⊗ ρE .
With d = 2−l and χ = 2−l
′′
, the exponents when non-negative are related from (27) for
n ≥ l as follows,
l − log n− 4 ≤ l
′′
≤ 2l (28)
Basically (27)-(28) shows that the exponents of d and χ for almost any n are within a factor
of two.
VII IT SEMANTIC SECURITY AND PRIVACYAM-
PLIFICATION
Note added: The term “semantic security,” which is also used in [2], is inappropriate since
it has been used in a different sense in classical cryptography.
What kind of raw security guarantee on K one should have that is comparable to that
of a uniform key? One can introduce the notion of information theoretic semantic security
directly as
|p(K˜)−
1
2|K˜|
| ≤ ǫ(K˜) (29)
where K˜ is any subset of K and ǫ(K˜) is allowed to vary depending on K˜ in contrast to
(4). Such “semantic security” in complexity-based cryptography has been developed exten-
sively [23] and generalized in an IT context [24]. However, in the context of IT physical
cryptography in noise we should dispense with any algorithm in the definition and consider
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the full correlated statistical behavior of the system model. Thus, (29) expresses the direct
comparison with the ideal uniform key. In fact, as long as ǫ(K˜) is small enough, such as
ǫ(K˜) = 2−|K˜|, we would not need to require that it can be driven to zero. It would be quite
adequate, e.g., if ǫ is a constant = 2−n for an n-bit K as discussed in section II.
In the case one can guarantee only ǫ = 2−m for m < n, it follows immediately that
no IT semantically secure key (with arbitrarily small ǫ) can be obtained by any further
processing on K which is longer than m. This is an immediate consequence of the fact that
p1 cannot be improved by any known deterministic transformation onK. Indeed, the original
p1 that results from Eve’s measurement Y before ECC+PAC also cannot be improved with
such codes, i.e., not by the transformation from Y to her estimate of K(Y ). Thus, the IT
semantically secure key rate is reduced from the nominal one by a factor m/n.
Let us consider the security of such an m-bit key Kr derived from the n-bit K. When
it is obtained from a d′ guarantee of (17), all the subset probabilities p(K˜) Eve may get
by any measurement is properly bounded from (2). The users can guarantee Iac
n
≤ 2−m
for sufficiently large m under any ρkE Eve can launch that passes intrusion level estimation.
However, in this case the resulting p(K˜) or p(E) bound for K˜ would not be quantum me-
chanically fundamental because Eve could attack a specific subset K˜ of K by an optimal
measurement directed toward that subset instead of the whole K. Thus she has a 2|K˜|-ary
detection problem instead of a 2|K|-ary one. Specifically, consider K in two parts K1, K2
(K = K1K2). In a KPA knowing K1 = k1, the state to Eve is ρ
k1K2
E and she has a 2
|K2|
-ary quantum detection problem instead of the original 2|K| -ary one. Her optimum 2|K2|
-ary quantum detection performance cannot in general be obtained from the 2|K| -ary perfor-
mance and subsequent classical reduction to 2|K2| -ary case. Quantum mechanically there is
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no complete measurement which covers all such possibilities while maintaining performance,
but there is classically.
The essential point is that quantum detection theory [18, 25] is the proper approach here
for optimal performance analysis, not “information theory” in the narrow sense. Thus, the
raw security guarantee on p(K˜) we have discussed is also not ultimate either except for the
total K itself. Note that the effect of PAC on fundamental quantitative security also needs
to be ascertained by quantum detection theory. The alternative is to bound d′.
VIII Problems of Unconditional Security Proofs in QKD
Note added: For updated criticisms see arXiv: 1205.3820v2 and arXiv: 1201.2804v1.
The criterion d fails to provide KPA security and composition security in general. If
Iac ≤ ε = 2
−l or d′ ≤ ǫ = 2−l for l ≥ n, the KPA security problem does not arise under
the qualification described in the last section. In addition, as discussed in section III and
reinforced by [27], that is (exponentially) impossible to achieve with the usual key generation
rate, and also cannot be achieved by privacy amplification. Furthermore, the key so generated
in a concrete protocol is unlikely to be long enough to cover the message authentication key
bits spent during key generation, such as in the case of [14]. See ref [2].
There is no “unconditional security” guarantee in QKD. Furthermore, we have now the
following broader fundamental QKD security problems.
(i) There is no proof of security against known-plaintext attacks when the generated key K
is used in direct encryption and Eve possesses quantum memory, or in other composition
security context.
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(ii) The fundamental raw security level of Eve’s probability of correctly estimating any
proper subset of K is not bounded under either an Iac or d constraint.
(iii) The true secure key rate is far smaller and is determined by quantitative error ex-
ponents, the later rarely analyzed in security proofs and for which M-ary quantum
detection theory would be needed.
With such difficulties on the foundation of quantum key distribution, it appears radically
new approaches are appropriate for fundamental security guarantee.
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